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Abstract—In secure multi-party computations (SMC), parties
wish to compute a function on their private data without reveal-
ing more information about their data than what the function
reveals. In this paper, we investigate two Shannon-type questions
on this problem. We first consider the traditional one-shot model
for SMC which does not assume a probabilistic prior on the data.
In this model, private communication and randomness are the
key enablers to secure computing, and we investigate a notion of
randomness cost and capacity. We then move to a probabilistic
model for the data, and propose a Shannon model for discrete
memoryless SMC. In this model, correlations among data are the
key enablers for secure computing, and we investigate a notion of
dependency which permits the secure computation of a function.
While the models and questions are general, this paper focuses
on summation functions, and relies on polar code constructions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a group of m parties, each with a private bit xi,
i ∈ [m] = {1, . . . ,m}, which are interested in computing
jointly a function f(x1, . . . , xm), without revealing any other
information (than what the function reveals) about their inputs
to anybody else. For example, the parties want to vote between
two candidates for presidency without revealing their vote, i.e.,
f(x1, . . . , xm) =
∑n
i=1 xi. Can this be achieved?
Note that we are asking here for an exact computation
of the function f , with an arbitrary number of parties m
(possibly low), and no information leakage. The latter re-
quirement means that no additional information about the
inputs must be shared than what would be shared in a model
with a trusted party, which takes care of the computation.
Hence, even in the case of a summation function, a noise-
perturbation approach will not work in this framework. Of
course, the above cannot be achieved without leveraging some
“security primitive”. With secure multi-party computations
(SMC), this goal is achieved by assuming that the parties have
access to private communication. The ideas of SMC were first
introduced by Yao in [16], in a two-party setup, in particular
with the millionaire problem. General multiparty protocols
were then obtained by Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson [8]
for computational security, and by Ben-Or, Goldwasser and
Wigderson [4] and by Chaum, Cre´peau and Damga˙rd [5]
for information-theoretic security, using in particular secret-
sharing [13]. This paper focuses on the latter setting.
Information-theoretic (IT) security does not rely on the
computational power of the adversary, i.e., on hardness as-
sumptions. The models and questions in IT SMC are however
very different than the ones studied in the Shannon informa-
tion theory models. In this paper, we consider the following
problems. First, we consider a traditional model for SMC
(with private communication, private access to randomness
and honest-but-curious parties) and investigate a notion of
randomness cost needed to compute a given function securely.
Identifying the least amount of randomness is primarily a
question which we find mathematically interesting and which
connects to information theory subjects, in particular to the
study of entropy vectors. It is however also a notion which
captures the complexity of a function f for its secure com-
putation1. In the second part of the paper, we propose a
Shannon model for SMC, assuming the parties input to be
drawn from a discrete memoryless source, and requiring the
function computation and the security requirement to hold up
to a vanishing error probability in an asymptotic regime. In
this model, the correlation among the data can be leveraged to
obtain secure computations. This model departs significantly
from the traditional SMC models discussed above, on the
other hand, it is defined in a similar setting as for traditional
information theory problems such secrecy [2], [11], [6] or
wire-tap channels [15]. Along these lines, a Shannon type
model was recently proposed in [14] for a notion of “secure
computation”, which is however different than SMC and the
notions discussed in this paper. In [14], the parties wish to
compute a function on their inputs using communication links
which are eavesdropped, and the goal is to compute f without
allowing an eavesdropper to compute it. This is different from
our setting, where the communication links between parties are
secured, and where the parties themselves are the eavesdropper
toward one another. Other works relevant to our setting are
the interactive source compression [10] and the compress and
compute problems [9], [12], but again, these do not take into
account the privacy of the inputs among the parties.
II. NOTATION
In what follows, [n] = {1, ..., n}, |A| denotes the cardinality
of a set A, Xn denotes a vector of length n and Xi represents
the ith element of the vector Xn. For x ∈ {0, 1}n and S ∈ [n],
x[S] = {xi : i ∈ S}. Finally, for two vectors Xn and Y n,
Xn ⊕ Y n represents the component-wise XOR addition.
1There are various other complexity measures, such as the number of
communication rounds and the computational complexity.
III. ONE-SHOT MODEL
In this section, secure multi-party computation protocols are
studied in the one-shot setting, where the parties’ inputs have
no probabilistic prior (equivalently a uniform prior) and where
the function computation is done once.
Definition 1. In the honest-but-curious-network (HCN) model,
1) any pair of parties can communicate on a secured
channel,
2) each party has access to randomness privately,
3) every party is honest-but-curious2, i.e., the parties follow
the protocol without deviating from it. However, collect-
ing all the information exchanged in the protocol, the
parties may try to learn additional information about
other parties’ inputs,
4) the parties have access to a synchronized clock.
A protocol Π in this model is a predetermined sequence of
actions taken by the parties on a finite time scale T , where T ≥
1 is odd. At time t = 0, each party possesses its own input.
At an odd time t ∈ {1, 3, . . . , T }, each party Pi possesses
Yi,t(Π), and can take the following actions:
a) draw a discrete random number Ri,t(Π),
b) make a computation using Yi,t(Π) and Ri,t(Π),
and at even time t ∈ {2, 4, . . . , T − 1}, each party can
transmit information to some other parties. Finally, we de-
fine the view of party Pi from the protocol by Yi(Π) =
(Yi,1(Π), Ri,1(Π), Yi,3(Π), Ri,3(Π), . . . , Yi,T (Π), Ri,T (Π)).
In SMCs, the notion of security is defined with the ideal
vs. real model paradigm. In the ideal model, trusted parties
provide securely their inputs to a trusted party which provides
back securely the outputs to them. The real protocol is then
deemed secure if any adversarial attack to the protocol has
a counterpart that can be simulated in the ideal model. We
refer to [7] for formal definitions. In this paper, we adopt the
following information theoretic definitions.
Definition 2. Let P1, . . . , Pm denote m parties, where party
Pi has input Xi, i ∈ [m]. For simplicity, the inputs are
assumed to take values in F2 = {0, 1}. We assume that
X1, . . . , Xm are independent and uniformly distributed3 ran-
dom variables. A protocol Π in the HCN model computes
accurately and securely deterministic functions f1, . . . , fm
(taking values in a discrete set) if
• [Accuracy] Each party Pi can compute fi(X1, . . . , Xm),
i.e., H(fi(X1, ..., Xm)|Yi(Π), Xi) = 0,
• [Security] Each party Pi does not learn more information
about the other parties’ inputs than what the function
reveals, i.e., H(X∼i|Xi, Yi(Π), fi(X1, ..., Xm))
= H(X∼i|Xi, fi(X1, ..., Xm)),
where X∼i = (Xj : j ∈ [m] \ {i}).
2Formal definitions are provided in [7].
3One can define the inputs to be deterministic instead of uniform and
provide worst-case notions of accuracy and security, which lead to the same
result for the purpose of this paper.
Definition 3. We define the least amount of randomness
that is required to compute accurately and securely functions
f1, . . . , fm on m inputs X1, . . . , Xm by
ρ(f1, . . . , fm) = inf
Π
H(Y1(Π), . . . , Ym(Π)|X1, . . . , Xm), (1)
where the minimization is over all protocols Π in the HCN
model which computes accurately and securely f1, . . . , fm.
Notice that ρ is invariant under the ordering of the functions.
Note that all the fi may be the same.
A. The XOR function
In this section, we investigate the XOR function, and assume
that one of the party computes the function. It can always
send back the output to other parties in a final round of the
protocol. The techniques are based on traditional one-time pad
and secret sharing steps.
Proposition 1. For any m ≥ 3,
ρ(∅, . . . , ∅, X1 ⊕ · · · ⊕Xm) = 1. (2)
Note that for m = 2 the problem is trivial, the party with
XOR function can always recover the other input.
Proof: We start by the converse. To show that
ρ(∅, . . . , ∅, X1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Xm) ≥ 1, it is enough to show
ρ(∅, ∅, X1 ⊕ X2 ⊕ X3) ≥ 1, since increasing the number of
parties only increases the randomness required by the protocol.
Clearly, since P3 has input X3, we have ρ(∅, ∅, X1⊕X2⊕
X3) = ρ(∅, ∅, X1⊕X2). Denote by A1 all the information that
was exchanged between P1 and P3 throughout the protocol,
and denote by A2 all the information that was exchanged
between P2 and P3 throughout the protocol.
From the accuracy requirement, we have
H(X1 ⊕X2|A1, A2) = 0, in addition to this,
from the security requirement on P3, we have
H(X1|A1, A2) = 1 and H(X2|A1, A2) = 1, which is
equivalent to
H(X1, X2|A1, A2) = 1 (3)
H(X1|A1, A2) = 1 (4)
H(X2|A1, A2) = 1. (5)
From the security requirement on P1 and P2, we have
H(X2|A1, X1) = 1 and H(X1|A2, X2) = 1. (6)
Finally, from the independence of the inputs
H(X1|X2) = 1 and H(X2|X1) = 1. (7)
Since A1 and A2 are only a part of all information transmitted
and received,
ρ(∅, ∅, X1 ⊕X2 ⊕X3) ≥ H(A1, A2|X1, X2). (8)
We now show that the last term is more than 1. We have
H(A1, A2|X1, X2) ≥ H(A2|X1, X2)
= H(A2|X2) (9)
= H(A2) (10)
≥ 1. (11)
(9) follows by (6) and (7), because
H(X1|A2, X2) = H(X1|X2)
⇐⇒ H(A2|X1, X2) = H(A2|X2),
and (10) follows by (5) because X2 and (A1, A2) are indepen-
dent, so in particular, X2 and A2 are independent. With the
same argument, we notice that (4) implies H(X1|A1) = 1.
Finally, (11) follows by (3) and (4) because
H(X1, X2|A1, A2) = H(X1|A1)
⇐⇒ H(X2, A2|X1, A1) = H(A2|A1), (12)
and with (5)
H(A2) ≥ H(A2|A1)
= H(X2, A2|X1, A1)
≥ H(X2|X1, A1) = 1.
We now move to the direct part. The achievability of the
lower bound is obtained with the following protocol. Consider
a multi-party computation protocol for X1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Xm. Let
A1, ..., Am−1 be information that Pm receives during the
protocol from P1, ..., Pm−1, respectively.
1) P1 draws a random number Z ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at
random and sends Z to Pm, Y2 = Z ⊕X1 to P2.
2) For k ∈ {2, ...,m − 1}, Pk receives Yk from Pk−1,
computes Yk+1 = Yk ⊕Xk = Z ⊕X1 ⊕ · · · ⊕Xk and
sends Yk+1 to Pk+1.
3) Pm receives Ym from Pm−1 and computes Ym⊕Xm⊕
Z = Z ⊕X1 ⊕ · · · ⊕Xm ⊕ Z = X1 ⊕ · · · ⊕Xm.
In this example, A1 = Z , A2 = · · · = Am−2 = ∅, and
Am−1 = Z ⊕X1 ⊕ · · · ⊕Xm−1. Thus,
H(A1, ..., Am−1|X1, ..., Xm−1)
= H(Z,X1 ⊕ · · · ⊕Xm−1|X1, ..., Xm−1)
= H(Z) = 1.
B. The real summation function
Proposition 2. For any m ≥ 3,
ρ(∅, . . . , ∅, X1 + · · ·+Xm) ≤ log2(m). (13)
Note that for m = 2 the problem is trivial, the party with
the summation can always recover the other input.
Proof: The upper bound of the randomness is shown by
the achievability. Consider a multi-party computation protocol
for X1+ · · ·+Xm. Let A1, ..., Am−1 be information that Pm
receives during the protocol from P1, ..., Pm−1, respectively.
1) P1 draws a random number Z ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m − 1}
uniformly at random and sends Z to Pm, Y2 = Z +X1
mod m to P2.
2) For k ∈ {2, ...,m − 1}, Pk receives Yk from Pk−1,
computes the addition in modulo m
Yk+1 = Yk +Xk = Z +X1 + · · ·+Xk
and sends Yk+1 to Pk+1.
3) Pm receives Ym from Pm−1 and computes the addition
and subtraction in modulo m
Ym +Xm − Z = Z +X1 + · · ·+Xm − Z = X1 + · · ·+Xm.
In this example, A1 = Z, A2 = · · · = Am−2 = ∅, and
Am−1 = Z +X1 + · · ·+Xm−1. Thus,
H(A1, . . . , Am−1|X1, ..., Xm−1)
= H(Z,X1 + · · ·+Xm−1|X1, . . . , Xm−1)
= H(Z) = log2m.
Conjecture 1. For any m ≥ 3,
ρ(∅, . . . , ∅, X1 + · · ·+Xm) = log2(m). (14)
While showing that log2(m) is necessary is not established,
we believe that a logarithmic bound in m can be obtained with
similar argument as for the XOR function. In particular, this
can be written as an inequality over entropic vectors, for which
Shanon-type inequalities may or may not suffice.
Remark 1. While this paper focuses on summation functions,
similar methods can be used for multiplications. Consider
for example the case where three parties wish to compute
(X1X2, X1X2, X1X2), i.e., the product of the first two par-
ties’ bits. This can be achieved with a protocol requiring 4 bits
of randomness. One possibility is two break each number into
three shares, two of which being uniformly distributed, i.e.,
X1 = X1(1) +X1(2) +X1(3) and X2 = X2(1) +X2(2) +
X2(3), and requiring party P1 and P2 to exchange all the bits
Xi(j) for i, j ∈ {1, 2} and to provide the bit X1(3), X2(3) to
party 3. Then each party has a component of the productX1X2
which can be transmitted to P3 for the function computation.
IV. DISCRETE MEMORYLESS SECURE MULTIPARTY
COMPUTATIONS
We now define a probabilistic model for the parties’ inputs,
and leverage the correlations among these inputs to obtain
protocols which are secure with high probability in the limit
of large sequences, without requiring private communication
channels between all parties.
Definition 4. Let n ≥ 1 and (Xn(1), . . . , Xn(m)) be i.i.d.
sequences with a joint distribution µ on Fm2 . Let P1, . . . , Pm
be m parties, where party Pi possesses the input sequence
Xn(i) and the distribution µ, for i ∈ [m].
We are now interested in sequences of deterministic proto-
cols, defined on the HCN model without item 2), where parties
exchange only deterministic functions of their inputs (no action
a)). A sequence of deterministic protocols {Πn}n≥1 computes
asymptotically accurately and privately the deterministic and
discrete function sequence {(fn(1), . . . , fn(m))}n≥1 if
• [Asymptotic accuracy] Each party Pi can compute
fn(i)(X
n
(1), . . . , X
n
(m)) with a vanishing error probability,
i.e., from the view of the protocol Y(i)(Πn) and its input
Xn(i), party i can compute an estimate fˆ
n
(i) such that
P{fˆn(i) 6= f
n
(i)(X
n
(1), . . . , X
n
(m))} → 0, as n→∞,
(15)
• [Asymptotic security] Each party Pi cannot recover the
input of another party, i.e., for any j 6= i, there is no
function Xˆn(j) of Y(i)(Πn) and Xn(i) such that
lim
n→∞
P{Xˆn(j) 6= X
n
(j)} → 0. (16)
Note that the above definition of security is weaker than
its counter-part in the one-shot setting by more than just
its asymptotic nature: it is not forbidden to just leak some
information, but to actually recover an input sequence.
Given a set of functions {fn(1), . . . , fn(m)}, our goal is to
study for which distributions µ on Fm2 it is possible to obtain
a protocol computing the functions accurately and securely in
the above asymptotic sense.
A. The XOR function
In this section, we introduce an asymptotically accurate and
secure protocol for the modulo-2 sum of three parties inputs.
Namely fn(i) = X
n ⊕ Y n ⊕ Zn for i = 1, 2, 3.
Definition 5. Let X and Y be binary random variables with a
joint distribution µ on F22. We call the distribution additively-
correlated if
H(X,Y )− 2H(X ⊕ Y ) > 0. (17)
Let X,Y, Z be binary random variables with a joint distribu-
tion µ on F32. We call the distribution additively-correlated if at
least one pair of the random variables is additively-correlated.
For example, X ∼ Ber(0.5), Z ∼ Ber(p), and Y = X⊕Z ,
where p < 0.5 satisfies (17).
Proposition 3. Let n ≥ 1 and (Xn, Y n, Zn) be i.i.d. se-
quences with a joint distribution µ on Fm2 which is pariwise-
additively-correlated. Then the ASP protocol defined below
allows to compute asymptotically accurately and securely the
function Xn ⊕ Y n ⊕ Zn.
This provides an achievability result.
Remark 2. The ASP protocol is based on polar codes. The
linearity of the code is crucial to compute the XOR function.
The protocol could probably be adapted with other linear
codes, such as random linear codes, however, polar codes
provide in addition a low-complexity protocol, and are also
insightful as a proof technique.
We next recall the source polarization results and then
describe the protocol.
B. Preliminaries on polar codes
For n a power of 2, define Gn =
(
1 0
1 1
)⊗ log
2
(n)
, where
A⊗k denotes the matrix obtained by taking k Kronecker
products of matrix A with itself.
Theorem 1. [3] Let Xn = [X1, ..., Xn] iid∼ Bernoulli(p),
where n is a power of 2, and let X˜n = XnGn. Then, for
any ǫ ∈ (0, 1/2],
|{j ∈ [n] : H(X˜j |X˜
j−1) ∈ (ǫ, 1− ǫ)}| = o(n),
where H(X˜j|X˜j−1) represents the conditional Shannon en-
tropy of X˜j given X˜j−1 = [X˜1, ..., X˜j−1]. The above still
holds if ε = O(2−nβ ), β < 1/2.
Theorem 1 says that, except for a vanishing fraction, all
conditional entropies H(X˜j |X˜j−1) tend to either 0 or 1. Also,
notice that since Gn is invertible, hence nH(p) = H(Xn) =
H(X˜n), and defining
Rǫ,n(X) := {i ∈ [n] : H(X˜i|X˜
i−1) ≥ ǫ}, (18)
we have
1
n
|Rǫ,n(X)| → H(p), (19)
where H(p) is the entropy of the Bernoulli(p) distribution.
Note that Rε,n(X) should be written Rε,n(p): it is not a
function of a random variable but X , but here X stands for the
marginal distribution of Xn. This notation will be handy be-
low. Since Rε,n(X) contains all the non-deterministic compo-
nents of X˜n, it is possible to reconstruct X˜n from X˜[Rε,n(X)]
with a vanishing probability of error. This requires setting
ε small enough, in particular one can chose ε = O(2−nβ ),
β < 1/2. With polar codes, one can addition obtain an efficient
decoding algorithm which runs in O(n log(n)).
C. The asymptotically secure polar (ASP) protocol
All the parties know µ and set ε = εn = 2−n
0.49
. Since µ
is additively-correlated, assume w.l.o.g that the inputs of P1
and P2 are additively-correlated.
1) Inputs at time 0:
party 1: Xn, party 2: Y n, party 3: Zn.
2) At time 1:
• P1 computes X˜n = XnGn and Rǫ,n(X ⊕ Y ),
• P2 computes Y˜ n = Y nGn and Rǫ,n(X ⊕ Y ).
3) At time 2:
• P1 sends X˜ [Rǫ,n(X ⊕ Y )] to P3,
• P2 sends Y˜ [Rǫ,n(X ⊕ Y )] to P3.
4) At time 3: P3 computes X˜[Rǫ,n(X⊕Y )]⊕ Y˜ [Rǫ,n(X⊕
Y )] = (X˜ ⊕ Y˜ )[Rǫ,n(X ⊕ Y )] and decodes X˜n ⊕ Y˜ n
from (X˜ ⊕ Y˜ )[Rǫ,n(X ⊕ Y )] using the polar decoding
algorithm in [3]. Let ˆ˜Xn ⊕ ˆ˜Y n be the decoded vector.
P3 computes Xˆn ⊕ Yˆ n = ( ˆ˜Xn ⊕ ˆ˜Y n)G−1n .
5) At time 4: P3 sends Xˆn ⊕ Yˆ n + Zn to P1 and P2.
D. Proof of Proposition 3
Lemma 1. The SPC protocol is asymptotically accurate.
Proof: Since Zn is not encoded during the protocol, it is
enough to prove that
Pr(Xˆn ⊕ Yˆ n 6= Xn ⊕ Y n) −−−−→
n→∞
0. (20)
This is a direct application of Theorem 1, as in [3].
Lemma 2. The SPC is asymptotically secure.
Proof: Since P1 receives only Xn ⊕ Y n ⊕ Zn during
the protocol, it is clear that it cannot estimate Y n or Zn with
a vanishing error probabilities. Similarly, P2 cannot estimate
Xn or Zn with a vanishing error probability. Therefore, to
prove that the protocol 2 is asymptotical secure for all parties,
it is enough to prove that for P3,
Pr(Xˆn 6= Xn)≫ 0 (21)
where an ≫ 0 means lim infn→∞ an > 0, and
Pr(Yˆ n 6= Y n)≫ 0, (22)
where Xˆn and Yˆ n are P3’s estimations of Xn and Y n given
X˜ [Rǫ,n(X ⊕ Y )] and Y˜ [Rǫ,n(X ⊕ Y )].
During the protocol, P3 receives X˜[Rǫ,n(X ⊕ Y )] and
Y˜ [Rǫ,n(X ⊕ Y )] and knows Xn ⊕ Y n with the vanishing
error probability by Theorem 1. Thus, for P3, knowing Xn
with the vanishing error probability guarantees recovery of
Y n = Xn ⊕ (Xn ⊕ Y n), and vice verse. Then,
Pr(Xˆn 6= Xn)→ 0 ∪ Pr(Yˆ n 6= Y n)→ 0
⇔ Pr(Xˆn, Yˆ n 6= Xn, Y n)→ 0. (23)
Therefore, it is enough to show Pr(Xˆn, Yˆ n 6= Xn, Y n)≫ 0.
Notice that
Xn, Y n → X˜[Rǫ,n(X ⊕ Y )], Y˜ [Rǫ,n(X ⊕ Y )]→ Xˆ
n, Yˆ n
forms a Markov chain. Then, by Fano’s inequality,
Pr(Xˆn, Yˆ n 6= Xn, Y n)
≥
H(Xn, Y n|X˜ [Rǫ,n(X ⊕ Y )], Y˜ [Rǫ,n(X ⊕ Y )]− 1
2n
≥
H(Xn, Y n)−H(X˜[Rǫ,n(X ⊕ Y )], Y˜ [Rǫ,n(X ⊕ Y )])− 1
2n
≥
H(Xn, Y n)− 2H(X˜[Rǫ,n(X ⊕ Y )])− 1
2n
≥
H(Xn, Y n)− 2|Rǫ,n(X ⊕ Y )| − 1
2n
=
nH(X,Y )− 2nH(X ⊕ Y )− 1
2n
(24)
where (24) follows from (19). Then, since Xn and Y n are
additively-correlated,
lim inf
n→∞
Pr(Xˆn, Yˆ n 6= Xn, Y n) > 0. (25)
Remark 3. Note that since the ASP protocol is asymptotically
secure, it must be that H(X,Y ) − 2H(X ⊕ Y ) > 0 implies
H(X)−H(X⊕Y ) > 0 and H(Y )−H(X⊕Y ) > 0. The rea-
son for that is due to the nested property of source polar codes,
see for example [1], which implies that if H(X+Y ) > H(X),
then Rε,n(X + Y ) contains Rε,n(X) and hence observing
X˜n[Rε,n(X + Y )] allows to decode Xn correctly. In fact the
above implication is true since
H(X,Y )− 2H(X ⊕ Y ) > 0
⇐⇒ H(X |X + Y ) > H(X ⊕ Y ) (26)
and H(X |X + Y ) ≤ H(X).
V. OPEN PROBLEMS
Concerning the first part, it would interesting to set conjec-
ture 1. We believe that a logarithmic bound can be obtained
with the approach of this paper. As mentioned in Remark 1, it
is possible to obtain achievability results on ρ for multivariate
polynomials. The scaling of the ρ can then be analyzed. For
the second part, it would be interesting to establish converse
results for XOR function, and any result for other type of
functions, starting perhaps with the real-addition.
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